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THE BEGINNINGS AND THE GROWTH OF
AERONAUTICAL LAW
ARNOLD D. MCNAIR*
Mr. Landis, Ladies and Gentlemen: I should like to begin by
saying how conscious I am of the honor done to me and the re-
sponsibility laid upon me in being invited to give this opening
address to the First National Legislative Air Conference held in
this country. It seems to me that the only excuse which the or-
ganizers of this conference can give to you for this part of the
program is that I am an English lawyer, and that it is the com-
mon law of England which forms the common heritage of our
two countries, and is one of the closest bonds which unite us and
help us to understand one another.
Now both here and in England a condition precedent to sound
legislation upon any topic is a knowledge of what the rules of the
common law governing that topic may be, and therefore it is that
I venture to address to you some observations which, but for that
common legal tradition that unites us, it would be impertinent for
a foreign lawyer to make.
Now, before I attempt to state to you the English common
law and statutory law upon this subject, I must first of all refer
to another source of air law, namely, international law, and in
particular, the International Convention for the Regulation of Aerial
Navigation, of the 13th of October, 1919, a Convention to which
twenty-seven states, including Great Britain, are already parties,
a number which is likely to be increased to thirty-one within the
next twelve months.
Now you can readily understand that in a continent like Europe,
which is divided into so many different state territories, it is not
surprising that from the very beginning the aspect of aeronautical
law, which has been most prominent, is the international one, for
purposes both of time of peace and for time of war.
Now, long before aerial navigation became a practical com-
mercial proposition the lawyers had been discussing the various
theories which should regulate this new form of transportation as
*Fellow and Senior Tutor of Gonville and Caius College, and Lecturer
in Law in the University of Cambridge; Barrister-at-Law, Cambridge, Eng-
land. Visiting Lecturer to the Air Law Institute.
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between countries, once it really became established, and that theo-
retical discussion had reached the following stage:
Firstly, over the high seas it was admitted that the air space
was free. Secondly, as regards the air space over land, including
internal and territorial waters, the theories which were competing
in the international spheres may be summarized as follows :'
(1) The first, that the air is free subject to the necessary rights
required in the interest of self-preservation. This theory is the one
that was adopted by the Institute of International Law in 1906.
It rests mainly on the argument that the air is physically incapable
of appropriation because it cannot be actually and continuously
occupied. That is substantially the same as one of the arguments
of Grotius in favor of the freedom of the seas. Sovereignty im-
plies occupation, and it was argued that since occupation of the
air is impossible, there can be no sovereignty in the air. But
sovereignty does not really involve continual presence any more
than private law possession does. A state can exercise sovereignty
over a huge desert, for instance, if it is in de facto control and is
in a position to suppress internal disorder and repel external at-
tack. In that sense many a state does control the air space above
it.
The analogy of the sea is rather interesting. If I may digress
for one moment, Justinian, some fourteen hundred years ago, as-
serted that the air and the sea were by natural law common to all.
In his time no use was made of the upper air, and very little use
was made of the high seas, so that statement went unchallenged.
But, in the Middle Ages, when men learned how to navigate the
high seas and the voyages of the great discoverers began, the
ownership of the high seas was claimed right and left by the differ-
ent states, and it took all the eloquence of Grotius and the lapse
of more than a century to destroy those claims.
Now, also that the upper air is becoming useful, claims of
sovereignty of it are being made and admitted on all -sides as re-
gards the air space over the territory of a state, and we may now
regard the theory of the freedom of the air over state territory
as definitely exploded. That was the first theory.
(2) The second was this: The second was based on the
analogy, of each state's maritime belt, or territorial waters; namely,
that there is a lower zone of territorial air space, and a higher,
1. Professor Hazeltine's Law of the Air (1911) contains the best ac-
count of these matters which has been published in England.
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unlimited zone of free air space. That theory, too, has been dis-
credited by events and need not detain us.
(3) The third theory was to the effect that the state has com-
plete sovereignty in its superincumbent air space to an unlimited
height, thus applying the cujus est solum maxim in a crude form.
This theory confers upon the territorial state the unfettered
right of excluding foreign aircraft, public or private, the right of
regulation of any foreign aircraft it may choose to admit, and the
right of jurisdiction over any foreign aircraft thus admitted.
(4) The fourth theory is practically number three with the
addition of a servitude of innocent passage for foreign non-military
aircraft, akin to the right of innocent passage of merchant ships
through territorial waters.
There, briefly, are the four theories which were agitating the
lawyers in the years preceding the great war. Possibly that is an
over-simplification of the theories that were being advocated, and
one could quite easily subdivide those four into a much longer
list, but substantially those four represent the principal theories,
and there was a mass of literature being poured our upon this
topic, and many, many discussions were taking place at international
legal gatherings. Then came the great war, and it accelerated a
decision as between those competing theories, and the one which
triumphed by treaty in Europe, including Great Britain, in the
year 1919, was the third, the theory of complete sovereignty, sub-
ject to a mutual treaty right of the free entry and passage of the
non-military aircraft of other countries.
I lay emphasis upon the fact that that is merely a treaty right,
not considered to exist by customary international law, and there-
fore requiring an express treaty for its creation.
That treaty is, of course, the Convention which I have already
mentioned, the International Convention of 1919 for the regulation
of Aerial Navigation, and I am going to direct your attention to
only three of the many clauses in that Convention. The first article
is this: "The high contracting parties recognize that every Power
has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the air space above its
territory
There you get laid down in the most emphatic terms the
third of the theories which I have outlined to you.
Article II: "Each contracting State undertakes in time of
peace to accord freedom of innocent passage above its territory
to the aircraft of the other contracting States."
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Article III: "No military aircraft of a contracting State shall
fly over the territory of another contracting State nor land there-
on without special authorization."
Well now, the United States of America signed that Conven-
tion of 1919, but did not ratify it. Nevertheless, it can safely be
stated that this theory of complete national sovereignty in the
superincumbent air space is accepted by this country, and indeed
by substantially the whole of this continent. It forms the basis
of the Pan-American Convention upon Commercial Aviation, of
1928, and equally of your recent treaty upon the same subject with
Canada. Moreover, by Section 6 of the Air Commerce Act of
1926, Congress declares that the Government of the United States
has, to the exclusion of all foreign nations, complete sovereignty of
the air space over the lands and waters of the United States, in-
cluding the Canal Zone, and also, Section 2 of the Uniform State
Law of Aeronautics, which has been adopted by twenty-one states
and Hawaii, declares "Sovereignty in the space above the lands
and waters of this state is declared to rest in the state except where
granted to and assumed by the United States pursuant to a con-
stitutional grant from the people of this state."
Therefore we may say that in the international sphere this
theory of complete national sovereignty in the air space has tri-
umphed, and that the growing practice is to create by convention
a mutual right of passage for non-military aircraft, and it can be
only a short time before that practice becomes universal as between
all states which have recognized one another and one another's
governments.
So much for the international sphere, and perhaps I ought
to apologize for the amount of time devoted to it, but you see,
from the point of view of the beginning of air law in Europe, that
international aspect is vital, because in a continent so divided up
into state territories as Europe, until one has settled the basic
international principles, it is difficult for any individual state to
proceed to develop its own national air law, and therefore, it was
not until after the Convention of 1919 that Great Britain took any
substantial steps in that direction.
Now, I would have you realize that that Convention of 1919
had a double aspect. It fulfills a double function. Primarily, it
regulates international aviation; that is, flights which cross the
frontiers of the state of departure. It is obvious, from those sec-
tions which I read to you, that that is its main, ostensible purpose;
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but secondarily and incidentally, it involves and produces a con-
siderable measure of unification in the private law of the states
which are parties to it. Clearly, the law as to the nationality of
aircraft, the registration and the marking of aircraft, as to cer-
tificates of airworthiness of aircraft and competency of pilots, as
to the documents which must be carried by aircraft, as to lights
and signals and air traffic rules and many other matters, must be
substantially uniform among states whose aircraft are flying over
one another's frontiers. That aspect of the matter has, of course,
been fully realized in this country and cannot fail to be of interest
to this conference; so that this Convention of 1919 forms the basis
of the British law of aviation in its administrative and regulatory
aspect, and accordingly necessitated the British Air Navigation Act
of 1920 and the many Orders in Council which have been issued
in pursuance of it.
I am not going to recite to you the numerous topics with
which that act deals. Many of them are of a highly technical char-
acter, but in the main they are based upon the Convention, in de-
siring to produce a uniformity amongst the different states that have
conceded to one another, by that Convention, a mutual right of
entry and passage. Obviously it matters very little to an aviator
what is the land law or the marriage law of a particular state that
he happens to be flying over; but it matters to him a great deal that
the air law of that particular state should be substantially identi-
cal with his own, and so long as doubt and uncertainty exist on
points like that you are bound to get obstacles in the development
of this new mode of transportation.
That is, however, only one aspect of the British Aviation Law,
the governmental aspect, and I propose now to touch very briefly
upon one or two other aspects more connected with private law,
and firstly, with the liability of the operator of an aircraft for
damage done to persons and property on land. You have all
heard of that ancient maxim, cujus est solum, ejus est usque
ad coelum, et ad inferos, a maxim which seems to have slipped
almost inadvertently into the English common law and is now
giving a great deal of trouble on both sides of the Atlantic. This
maxim, in spite of the imposing language in which it is enshrined,
is not found in Roman law, and was probably coined in the Middle
Ages by some commentator upon Justinian's digest. I think it is
Dean Pound who described a maxim as being a "substitute for
thought." It is a dangerous short cut. It is apt to operate in the
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same way in law as a slogan in public affairs, and now that our
courts are really being called upon to construe and apply this
maxim, it is becoming very difficult and very important to know
exactly what it means, and in particular, to know whether it means
that an aviator who flies across the land of another commits the
tort of trespass so as to expose himself to an action for damages
at the suit of the land owner.
My own view, and I am very glad indeed to find that it accords
with the view of Mr. George B. Logan, of St. Louis, is that the
maxim involves no such consequence, and in the recent Summer
School Conference which the Air Law Institute has been holding,
we have devoted a good deal of discussion to the meaning of that
maxim. The suggestion which I have made in the course of those
recent lectures is that a reasonable interpretation of the maxim
is as follows, namely, that-there is a presumption that the owner
of the surface is also the owner of any fixed contents of the air
space above it, and that he has the exclusive right of exploiting
and occupying that air space by filling it with fixed contents-,
buildings, mooring masts and so forth. I am disposed to admit
that you can own air if you can enclose it in a receptacle such as
a room or a bottle, but I incline to the view that space is not own-
able, and herein lies the importance of distinguishing between air
and air space. I am inclined to think that space is not capable
of legal ownership.
Obviously, that is a matter which we could discuss at great
length. It is not a purely academic matter, because courts of law,
both in your country and in mine, and particularly in this country
in those states that have not adopted the Uniform State Law upon
Aeronautics,, are being forced to direct their attention to this
maxim and to give it a reasonable interpretation. But in England
the British Air Navigation Act of 1920 has settled this question
by enacting as follows. Before I read part of the section, perhaps
I may put into popular language what it has done. It says, in
effect, no action for trespass or nuisance lies for a mere flight at a
reasonable height over the property of another, but if any material
loss or damage is done an absolute duty rests upon the operator of
the aircraft, the owner of the aircraft, to make compensation. That
is, in popular language, what our 'Parliament has enacted to this
point.
Now if I may just read the really important part of this sec-
tion nine of the British Act of 1920, it is as follows: "No action
shall lie in respect of trespass or in respect of nuisance by reason
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only of the flight of aircraft over any property at a height above
the ground which, having regard to wind, weather and all the cir-
cumstances of the case, is reasonable; or the ordinary incidents of
such flight, so long as the provisions of this Act and any order made
thereunder and of the Convention are duly complied with." I will
stop there for a moment.
That is what we may call the "disabling" part of the section.
In effect it says: if it be the fact that the common law gives an
action of trespass or nuisance against an aviator who flies across
another person's land in an unreasonable manner, then we disable
such land owner from taking such action against an aviator who
behaves in a reasonable fashion, and complies with the Act and the
orders in Council and in Convention.
Now we come to the second part of this provision, which I
call the enabling part, because it creates a court of action. That
is as follows: "But where material damage or loss is caused by
an aircraft in flight, taking off, or landing, or by any person in such
aircraft, or by any article falling from such aircraft, to any person
or property on land or water, damages shall be recoverable from
the owner of the aircraft in respect of such damage or loss, without
proof of negligence or intention or other cause of action, as though
the same had been caused by his wilful act, neglect or default, ex-
cept where the damage or loss was caused by or contributed to by
the negligence of the person by whom the same was suffered."
Thereby you see the Act creates a .statutory cause of action, a new
statutory tort.
There may'well be in common law a cause of action against
a negligent aviator, but here if any material damage or loss is
caused to a person or property on the ground the party so injured
has an absolute right to recover against the owner of the aircraft,
who may be a more substantial person than the pilot, for any loss
or damage thus incurred, unless the defendant can show it was the
plaintiff's negligence which caused or contributed to the loss or
damage.
I give you there the gist of the section. Notice that our law
places the liability on the owner, leaving him to recover against
any person such as a friend or servant who may be personally
responsible for the damage that resulted.
But there is one case in which it is not the owner, and that is
in the case of what I may call an "out and out" charter of the air-
craft exceeding fourteen days. I mean by "out and out" namely,
that no pilot or other member of the crew is taken over by the
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charterer. In that case, where there is an "out and out" charter
of the aircraft exceeding fourteen days, the statute substitutes the
charterer for the owner as the person liable under that section.
There is only one qualification to be made upon that section,
and that is made by Section 18, which says that Section 9 does not
apply to aircraft belonging to or exclusively employed in the
service of His Majesty unless and until it may be made applicable
by an Order in Council. No such Order in Council has yet been
made. That was merely a desire to protect the Crown against
actions for damage done by governmental aircraft.
It is obvious, too, that that Section 9 imposes a compromise, a
bargain, between the aviator and the general public, namely, no
liability on the aviator for the mere flight of an aircraft over the
land of another at a reasonable height and in a reasonable man-
ner, but absolute liability of the owner or charterer of an aircraft
for any material loss or damage resulting to any person or property
on land. In that fashion has the British Parliament laid the ghost,
the usque ad coelum ghost, by consigning it ad inferos.
Now just a word or two as to one or two other sources of
English, law relating to aircraft. Today in England, in Great
Britain, apart from a few minor matters such as police court prose-
cutions for low flying and a Scottish decision on ballooning, we
have in Great Britain no reported decision upon any areonautical
question, therefore our law, apart from the statute and Orders in
Council, has to be sought in the speculative opinions of writers
and in the actual advice given by lawyers connected with the avia-
tion industry or making claims against it.
As to the contract of carriage, I think it is generally admitted
that there is no reason inherent in the nature of aviation why a
corporation which operates aircraft for gain should not be a com-
mon carrier, both as to goods and as to passengers, 2 and that prima
facie such a corporation is a common carrier, and of course we all
know what degree of liability the possession of that status entails.
But in practice, these corporations in England take steps to
repudiate that status and the ensuing liability, and legally they
are able to do so provided the words they use are unambiguous and
otherwise effective. All air carriers who operate between Great
Britain and other countries carry both goods and passengers on
the basis of certain general transport conditions which have been
2. By English law the degree of liability incurred in the carriage of
passcgers is quite different from the liability in regard to goods.
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negotiated by international agreement and prevail practically
throughout the European continent.
Well now, my duty is merely to refer to the beginnings and
the development of aerial law and it is obviously quite impossible
for me to attempt to give you a complete sketch. I am only going
to make one more general remark, and that is upon the alleged
analogy between the aircraft and the ship, an analogy which one
is very apt to adopt by reason of the many nautical terms that
are used in connection with aviation.
Of course, a ship has been endowed by the law with a very
peculiar juristic status. Metaphorically, that status is sometimes
put like this, by saying that the ship is a floating portion of its
own state's territory. That is a dangerous metaphor, and person-
ally I should never dare to state the law like that, but it suffices to
illustrate my point that a ship differs from any other kind of mov-
able property, like an automobile, in the fact that it attracts to it
certain peculiar characteristics, and in particular attracts to it the
jurisdiction of its home state wherever it may be; if on the high
seas, exclusive jurisdiction of its home state, if in some other state's
territorial water, then a concomitant jurisdiction of its home state,
and therefore of course what we call the law of the flag, the law
of the nationality of that ship, is always available to regulate the
many things that may occur and transactions that may be carried
out on such a ship-crimes, torts, contracts, births, deaths, mar-
riages, wills, et cetera.
You can thus see why we must pause before we liken an air-
craft to a ship in a wholesale fashion, and apply to it the law of
ships, just as if it were a new kind of ship, just as if it differed
from a steamer, a coal driven steamer, in the way a motor driven
steamer differs from a coal driven steamer. English law has not
identified aircraft with ships, and automatically and universally
applied to aircraft all the peculiar juristic qualities belonging to
the ship. Nevertheless, in several special topics such as salvage
service rendered to or by aircraft at sea, our legislature has adopted
the maritime analogy and likened aircraft to ships, but any general
maritime analogy has been rejected.
It seems to me, if I may venture to say so, that any group
of persons vsho are contemplating legislating with regard to air-
craft have got to consider very carefully what attitude they are
going to adopt toward that very seductive analogy of the ship, and
consider how far they are going to adopt it, consider whether they
are going to adopt it wholesale, with all its juristic consequences,
